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COMPLEMENTARITY AND POST-COLONIALITY
Nirej Sekhon*
ABSTRACT
The International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction is complementary to that of
national criminal jurisdictions. While most agree that complementarity is a
cornerstone principle, debate continues as to what precisely it should mean for
the ICC’s relationship to national criminal justice actors. “Positive
complementarity,” a view many commentators hold, suggests that the ICC
should use its power to educate, persuade, and prod states parties to undertake
international criminal law investigations. For positive complementarity’s more
optimistic proponents, the future holds promise for a coordinated system of
global justice in which the ICC plays a secondary role to national courts in
vindicating international criminal law violations. In this essay, based on
remarks presented at the Emory International Law Review’s 2013 Symposium
on the ICC’s future, I argue that a robust regime of positive complementarity
will require that the ICC deftly navigate a post-colonial landscape—i.e.,
widespread underdevelopment, political and social fragmentation, and
epistemic heterogeneity. Doing so effectively will require tools the ICC does
not have and a willingness to make political judgments that may seem
unbecoming of a court. These limitations raise more profound questions about
whether the ICC can speak to those who inhabit the globe’s most desperately
marginal spaces. While I am skeptical that it can, it is also unclear that
domestic criminal justice actors are better equipped to do so. I conclude by
suggesting that it may be more constructive to analyze complementarity
through a descriptive lens rather than in grand normative terms. In this vein, I
suggest that a “governmentality” framework that focuses on the development
of bureaucratic culture may be useful for future research on complementarity.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Jonathan Todres,
Natsu Saito, and Deepa Varadarajan for comments.
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INTRODUCTION
Given the number of adjectives used to describe complementarity and the
pages written about it,1 one would think that the issue regularly arose in the
International Criminal Court (ICC). But more than ten years after the ICC’s
creation, complementarity discourse remains primarily about the ICC’s—and
international criminal law’s (ICL’s)—future. While the Rome Statute notes
that the ICC shall be “complementary to national criminal jurisdictions,”2 the
treaty does not provide a specific template for complementarity. For the more
optimistic proponents of “positive complementarity,”3 the future holds the
promise of a coordinated system of global justice in which the ICC plays a
secondary role to national courts in vindicating ICL violations.4 Proponents
argue that the Court’s organs—primarily the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)—
should use their power under the treaty to educate, persuade, and prod states
parties to undertake domestic ICL prosecutions.5

1 See, e.g., Silvana Arbia & Giovanni Bassy, Proactive Complementarity: A Registrar’s Perspective, in
1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY 52, 54‒55 (Carsten Stahn & Mohamed El
Zeidy eds., 2011) (“positive complementarity,” “negative complementarity,” and “passive complementarity”);
Michael Newton, The Quest For Constructive Complementarity, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND COMPLEMENTARITY, supra, at 304 (“constructive complementarity”); William W. Burke-White,
Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court And National Courts In The Rome System Of
International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 54 (2008) (“proactive complementarity”).
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3 Burke-White, supra note 1, at 54 n.4.
4 See id. at 54–55
5 See id. at 55–56.
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In the discussion that follows, I address the question posed by the
symposium’s organizers by arguing that the more ambitious account of
positive complementarity may not be the most “constructive” way to think
about the subject. An ambitious notion of positive complementarity will
require that the ICC deftly navigate a post-colonial landscape—widespread
underdevelopment, political and social fragmentation, and epistemic
heterogeneity. Doing so effectively will require tools the ICC does not have
and a willingness to make political judgments that may seem unbecoming of a
court. In Part II below, I develop this argument and conclude by suggesting
that the complementarity debate raises more profound questions about the ICC
and ICL more generally. Neither seems particularly well equipped to speak to
“the subaltern”—those who inhabit the globe’s desperately marginal spaces
and are most vulnerable to the harms ICL is concerned with.
In Part III, I suggest that it may be more constructive to analyze
complementarity through a modest descriptive lens rather than in grand,
normative terms. In this vein, I suggest that the notion of “governmentality”
may be a useful framework for understanding complementarity.
I. BACKGROUND
Unlike most international criminal tribunals of the past—which adjudicated
to the exclusion of domestic courts6—the Rome Statute envisages a
“complementary” relation between the ICC and national criminal
jurisdictions.7 “Complementarity” describes the relationship.8 It is one of the
Rome Statute’s cornerstone principles.9 Former Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo
noted that success for the ICC might mean that cases stop reaching it.10 This is
6 See Burke-White, supra note 1, 65. While this has typically been true, there have been so-called hybrid
tribunals that combine features of international and national courts. See DAVID LUBAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 122 (2010) (discussing the Special Court for Sierra Leone). These,
however, have been conflict-specific like other international tribunals of the past. Laura A. Dickinson, The
Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 (2003).
7 Rome Statute supra note 2, pmbl, art. 1.
8 The word complementarity arose during the drafting of the Rome Statute. See Observations of
Governments on the Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 46th
Sess., June 29, 1994, para. 35, (1994), reprinted in 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION,
21 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part I), U.N. Sales No. E.96.V.Z. (Part I) (1994).
9 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/06, Decision on the Practices of Witness
Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, para. 34 n.38 (Nov. 8, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc243711.pdf.
10 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, A Positive Approach To Complementarity: The Impact Of The Office Of The
Prosecutor, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 1, at 24.
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to hope that, using the Rome’s Statute’s language, widespread domestic
prosecutions of ICL violations would render cases inadmissible before the
ICC.11 The more optimistic accounts suggest that complementarity could usher
in an era of broad and deep responsiveness to ICL violations by domestic
criminal justice actors, with the ICC playing a supporting role.12 The Rome
Statute, however, does not provide a detailed framework for such a robust
regime of complementarity.
The Rome Statute’s operative provisions regarding complementarity are
found in Articles 17 through 19. Because these provisions have been the
subject of extensive summary and discussion elsewhere,13 only a brief
description is necessary here. Article 17 provides that the Court shall deem a
case “inadmissible” where it is being (or has been) “investigated or prosecuted
by a State” unless that effort is not (or was not) genuine.14 The latter exception
allows the ICC to proceed in cases where, among other circumstances, a state
has initiated legal process against an individual to “shield[] the person . . . from
criminal responsibility.”15 The ICC may also proceed in circumstances where
“[t]here has been an unjustified delay” in the state proceedings.16 Either the
accused or a state with jurisdiction over a case may raise admissibility before
the ICC.17 To ensure that states with jurisdiction have an opportunity to do so,
the OTP must notify such states upon concluding that there is a reasonable
basis for an investigation.18 The Rome Statute limits when and how frequently
admissibility challenges may be brought.19
The Rome Statute’s drafters included the admissibility provisions to placate
potential states parties concerned about ratification’s sovereignty costs.20
Although the ICC is similar to past international criminal tribunals with regard
11

See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1).
See, e.g., id.; Carsten Stahn, Taking Complementarity Seriously, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 1, at 233, 236; Christoph Burchard, Complementarity as Global
Governance, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 1, at 167, 169.
13 See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Introduction, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 1, at 1, 8–12; Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complimentarity in Crisis:
Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 122–24 (2009);
Michael Newton, The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 133–37 (2010).
14 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art.17(1)(a)–(b).
15 See id. art. 17(2)(a).
16 See id. art. 17(2)(b).
17 See id. art. 19(2).
18 See id. art. 18(1).
19 See id. art. 19(4).
20 See Burke-White, supra note 1, at 64–65.
12
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to the substantive crimes over which it has jurisdiction and the absence of head
of state immunity,21 it is the first such tribunal with an indefinite and openended mandate; past tribunals were created for adjudicating cases that arose
from a specific conflict involving specific states.22 In theory, any state party’s
(and even some non-party states) nationals could find themselves before the
ICC.23 The admissibility provisions also address the obvious fact that resource
constraints will prevent the ICC from adjudicating anything but a sliver of the
cases over which it will have jurisdiction.24 This history tends to support a
“negative” or “passive” view of complementarity.25 By this view, the ICC
should give wide berth to domestic prosecutions and only step in as a court of
last resort when a state fails to satisfy its obligation to investigate and
prosecute.26
In contrast, many commentators view the Rome Statute as creating the
basis for vigorous, collaborative relationships between the ICC and States.
These commentators tend to use adjectives like “positive” or “proactive” to
describe complementarity.27 They view complementarity as creating leverage
for the ICC to cajole or coerce state actors into investigating and prosecuting
violations of ICL;28 to correct deficiencies within states that are inclined to
investigate and prosecute such crimes, but do so imperfectly;29 and generally
support states’ efforts for carrying out such investigations.30 For example,
William Burke-White has proposed the notion of “proactive complementarity”
whereby the ICC would use its “legal and political powers to activate states’
domestic courts in international criminal prosecutions.”31

21 Compare Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 5, 27, with Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia arts. 3–5, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, (May 25, 1993) (adopting the Statute as
proposed by the Secretary-General in U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex (May 3, 1993).
22 See generally LUBAN, supra note 6, at 95–129.
23 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12; Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and
Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 13–14, 14 n.3 (2001).
24 See Burke-White, supra note 1, at 54, 66–67.
25 See Arbia & Bassy, supra note 1, at 55; Burke-White, supra note 1, at 56.
26 See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 1, at 56.
27 See, e.g., Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 10, at 23–24; Stahn, supra note 12, at 261; Burke-White, supra
note 1, at 56‒57. Throughout the paper, unless specifically noted otherwise, I will use the adjective “positive”
generically to refer to the body of commentators who take such a view.
28 See Burke-White, supra note 1, at 57–58.
29 See Burchard, supra note 12, at 180.
30 See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 10, at 23–24.
31 Burke-White, supra note 1, at 57.
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While the Rome Statute requires communication and cooperation between
the Court and states, it does not lay out a precise template for positive
complementarity.32 Notwithstanding the ambiguity, the more enthusiastic
proponents of positive complementarity view the ICC as part of an evolving
system of coordinated, global justice.33 Even if this ideal is not as heady as that
of an earlier generation of international law commentators—i.e., a vision in
which international institutions’ growth was coterminous with sovereignty’s
dissipation34—its vision of an activated, but harnessed, sovereignty remains
ambitious. As a practical matter,we should question what a regime of positive
complementarity actually stands to achieve and to what end.
II. POST-COLONIAL DILEMMAS
Positive complementarity posits that the ICC will engage states in a
vigorous and multidimensional way to promote broader domestic enforcement
of ICL.35 The bulk of this engagement will presumably occur within postcolonial states that inhabit the global order’s periphery. The post-colonial
landscape is marked bs economic underdevelopment and internal political
fragmentation that does not necessarily conform to Western models of
“interest” or “minority” politics.36 A robust notion of positive complementarity
will require the ICC to navigate this heterogeneous and complex landscape. I
suggest below that it will be impossible for the ICC to do so in a manner that is
neutral and apolitical. It is likely that the ICC is entirely ill-equipped to handle
the more significant challenges post-colonial states present. This, in turn, raises
deeper questions about ICL’s capacity to speak to those who are most
vulnerable to the harms ICL is concerned with.
A. Justice Without Judges?
If positive complementarity is to institute a new era of coordinated criminal
justice, there must be reasonably well-developed institutions in post-colonial
states for investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating. To the extent that that is
32

See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 18, 86, 87, 93.
See Burchard, supra note 12, at 167 (applying “global governance theory” to complementarity);
Burke-White, supra note 1, at 57 (describing the “Rome System of Justice”).
34 See, e.g., Newton, supra note 13, at 119 (quoting Benjamin Ferencz, Address to the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court (June 16,
1998)).
35 See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 10, at 23–24.
36 See PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED 37 (2004) (describing politics of
development in post-colonial states).
33
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not true, the ICC is unlikely to have a significant role in facilitating the
development of such.
1. Rule of Law in the “Third World”
The notion of positive complementarity suggests we conceptualize ICL as
part of a broader rule of law program in the so-called “third world.” The
expression “rule of law” describes any development program that assumes
liberal precepts of governmental accountability and promotes the creation of
formal, state-administered dispute resolution mechanisms that conform to due
process.37 The goal is not only to promote peaceful dispute resolution within a
state, but also the related ends of economic efficiency and growth.38 Increasing
judicial independence, institutional case-processing capacity, and access to
courts are the kinds of programmatic issues that rule of law initiatives tend to
focus upon.39
A cursory look at the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index suggests a
broad divide between the Global North and the rest.40 The Index reflects
dozens of factors and sub-factors including limits on governmental authority,
checks on official corruption, crime control, access to civil justice, and so
forth.41 Every situation that the OTP is currently investigating or prosecuting
involves African states that tend to score low for most factors on the Rule of
Law Index (when there is data available at all).42 That is to say these states’
lack of capacity to investigate or prosecute violations of ICL is likely
symptomatic of both deeper and broader rule of law problems. This in turn
suggests, quite unsurprisingly, that cultivating greater capacity to investigate
and prosecute violations of ICL in developing states will have to be tied to
broader institutional reforms.

37 See Juan Carlos Botero & Alejandro Ponce, Measuring The Rule of Law 5 (The World Justice Project,
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 001 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1966257.
38 See, e.g., Roberto Laver, The World Bank and Judicial Reform: Overcoming “Blind Spots” in the
Approach To Judicial Independence, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 183, 185‒87 (2012).
39 See id.
40 See MARK DAVID AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT: RULE OF LAW INDEX 2012‒2013, at
25 (2013), available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Index_Report_2012.pdf.
41 Id. at 11.
42 Compare INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/Pages/default.aspx (last visited June
26, 2013) (listing situations being investigated) with Rule Of Law Index Map, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, http://
worldjusticeproject.org/rule-law-index-map (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
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Positive complementarity is likely to work in only a specific subset of postcolonial states. Under the Rome Statute, complementarity is limited to contexts
in which a state’s justice institutions are available to effectively respond to ICL
violations.43 This encompasses situations where an violation unfolded (or is
unfolding) without significantly compromising the relevant state institutions’
independence or integrity.44 It is in relation to such states that proponents of
positive complementarity propose the ICC use its power and resources to
promote domestic capacity for adjudicating ICL cases.45 The prime contenders
are likely to be states that inhabit the duskier, but not altogether dark, corners
of the global imagination: “third-world” countries that are afflicted by the
pathologies endemic to post-colonial governance—but remediably so.46
Whatever adjective one might deploy—“third world,” “underdeveloped,”
“global south,” or some other—positive complementarity’s canvas will be
those poor states that are prone to bouts of mass violence, but are not entirely
hobbled by it or wholly complicit in its perpetuation.47
Kenya is a good example. Kenya’s recent experience with rule-of-law
initiatives illustrates the kind of problems that capacity building initiatives
might attempt to remedy.48 The situation in Kenya relating to 2008 electoral
violence was the OTP’s first self-initiated investigation.49 The World Bank, in
fact, interpreted the failure to refer election violence-related cases to Kenyan
courts as emblematic of the public’s lack of confidence in Kenya’s justice
system.50 However, the lack of public confidence predates the 2008 election
violence.51 The longstanding deficiency in public confidence is attributable to
substantial case backlogs, ineffective case management, and the poor training
43

See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
See id. arts. 17(2)–(3).
45 See Burke-White, supra note 1, at 57.
46 Cf. CHATTERJEE, supra note 36, at 37.
47 This would disqualify states with extraordinarily weak governments where there is minimal or no
judicial capacity—e.g., Rwanda in the immediate wake of the 1994 genocide. See John T. Holmes,
Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667, 668 (Antonio Cassese et al eds., 2002). Sudan is an example of a
government that is so completely complicit in the violence that any tribunal it established would be suspect.
See Robert Cryer, Darfur: Complementarity As The Drafters Intended, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 1, at 1097, 1107–11, 1113–15, 1117–18.
48 See Int’l Dev. Ass’n, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 78.9
Million to the Republic of Kenya for a Judicial Performance Improvement Project, Report No. 72979-KE, 1–3
(Oct. 22, 2012).
49 Brian D. Lepard, How Should The ICC Prosecutor Exercise His Or Her Discretion? The Role Of
Fundamental Ethical Principles, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 553, 556 (2010).
50 See Int’l Dev. Ass’n, supra note 48, at 3.
51 Id.
44
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and treatment of judicial staff.52 These dynamics have together created a court
system that is “inaccessible, an instrument of the executive, and corrupt.”53
The judiciary’s inadequacy hampers both political accountability and
economic growth.54 With regard to the latter, the Kenyan government views
reform as an essential component of its plan to become a middle-income state
by 2030.55 In 2012, the World Bank agreed to provide $120 million in loans to
support, among other things, the development of case management systems for
the courts, supporting the training and development of court and attorney
general personnel, and the construction of court buildings.56
This suggests that the Kenyan courts’ failure to process violations of ICL
might not represent a circumscribed evil exclusively attributable to the state’s
calculated obstruction. Such failure is almost certainly linked to the broader
deficiencies described above.57 As at least one commentator has noted,
enforcing ICL norms is not just a simple matter of states incorporating ICL
norms into their domestic criminal codes.58 ICL cases are legally and factually
more complex than regular criminal cases.59 Investigating and prosecuting ICL
violations will demand personnel with specialized training and be more
resource-intensive than run-of-the-mill criminal and civil matters.60 To the
extent that Kenyan courts do a poor job processing ordinary cases, it is not
surprising that the same is true for the exceptional ones.61
It is unclear whether building the capacity to investigate and prosecute ICL
violations can be accomplished in a state like Kenya without sacrificing some
other dimension of rule of law development. Resource scarcity might mean
that developing capacity in one area may come at the expense of developing it
in another. Even if not perfectly zero-sum, there are likely to be tradeoffs.
Choosing between ICL capacity building and other kinds of capacity building

52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at ii.
See supra notes 48–56 and accompanying text.
See Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 202, 247–48

(2012).
59 See id. at 216. There are various reasons for this, but one important one is that proving an ICL
violation will often require proof of “a particular contextual element,” e.g., widespread and systematic against
a civilian population for crimes against humanity. Id.
60 Id.
61 See Int’l Dev. Ass’n, supra note 48, at 6.
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implicates difficult moral and technocratic questions.62 These are not the sort
of questions that the ICC is well suited to address.63
2. ICC and Capacity Building
Resource limitations coupled with the Rome Statute’s formal constraints
make it impossible for the ICC to lead any significant capacity building
projects in poor states. Officers within the ICC have made it clear that they do
not understand complementarity to entail such capacity building.64 At best, the
ICC might play an indirect and subtle role in shaping such efforts.65 The
capacity building tools—if that is even the right way to conceptualize them—
available to the ICC are quite limited, consisting of pedagogical and shaming
strategies.66
The ICC’s limited budget makes it impossible for it to do much more than
process a relatively limited set of cases—there are currently twenty-one cases
before the ICC.67 In fiscal 2012, the budget for the ICC was roughly $140
million.68 This is not enough to support development projects like the Kenyan
judicial capacity building project described in Subpart 1 above.69 While that
may be a particularly ambitious project, the World Bank commonly funds rule
of law projects in the tens of millions.70 That the ICC’s budget will not permit
significant capacity building projects is unsurprising. The Rome Statute’s
drafters did not intend for the ICC to engage in development financing.71

62 See Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict, What Impact on Building
the Rule of Law, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 266 (2007).
63 See Burke-White, supra note 1, at 96–98.
64 See Morten Bergsmo et al., Complementarity After Kampala: Capacity Building and the ICC’s Legal
Tools, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 791, 798 (2010).
65 See Burke-White, supra note 1, at 95. Burke-White advocates for the ICC playing a role in mobilizing
“external resource networks” to promote judicial reforms in States that are unwilling or unable to prosecute
ICL violations. Id. It is, however, unclear as to what precisely this might mean and whether the ICC would
have any expertise to offer with regard to the moral and technocratic questions that are implicated by rule-oflaw type development assistance. See supra Part II.A.1.
66 Burke-White, supra note 1, at 95–96; Joseph M. Isanga, The International Criminal Court Ten Years
Later, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 247 (2013).
67 Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%
20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
68 Jon Silverman, Ten Years, $900 Million, One Verdict: Does the ICC Cost Too Much, BBC NEWS
MAGAZINE (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17351946.
69 See supra Part I.A.1.
70 See Laver, supra note 38, at 199–200.
71 Bergsmo, supra note 64, at 798.
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The Rome Statute’s provisions suggest that the practice of complementarity
will flow from the ICC’s ability to leverage its power to adjudicate particular
cases and states parties’ obligation to “cooperate fully” with ICC investigations
and prosecutions.72
As with prior international criminal tribunals, pedagogical aspirations
account for the ICC’s creation. The Rome Statute’s drafters hoped that the ICC
would, at the very least, work with domestic criminal justice institutions, if not
teach by example.73 In that vein, the Rome Statute codifies specific obligations
regarding coordination and cooperation between the Court and states parties.74
The articles relating to state party cooperation, by and large, concern the
provision of assistance in the ICC’s investigation and prosecution of specific
cases.75 One could imagine ICC personnel developing relations with domestic
criminal justice actors in a manner that creates opportunities for information
sharing, training, and more general dialogue about ICL violations within a state
party’s borders.76
While cooperation is laudable, it is merely the carrot, the reward inducing
specific behavior. The threat of investigation and prosecution is therefore the
stick, the primary device the ICC has at its disposal for promoting
complementarity.77 Articles 17 and 19 only permit the ICC to proceed with an
investigation or prosecution if there has not been (or presently is not) a
meaningful national criminal investigation or prosecution.78 William BurkeWhite has suggested that the OTP proactively leverage its authority to
investigate ICL violations to incentivize domestic investigations of the same.79
The OTP might use its authority to help domestic criminal justice actors
identify ICL violations that they otherwise would not have.80 Or the OTP
might simply scare domestic actors into taking action lest the OTP investigate
and embarrass the state on the global stage.81 This threat is limited by the fact
that the ICC only has the resources to process a small number of cases.82 In

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 86.
Id. pmbl.
Id. arts. 86–87.
See id.
Burke-White, supra note 1, at 89, 93.
Id. at 86.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 17, 19.
Burke-White, supra note 1, at 86.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.2.
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addition, threats will not alter the resource constraints created by
underdevelopment.83 The assumptions underlying positive complementarity
also raise questions about the purpose and consequences of complementarity
more generally.
Both the pedagogical and threat-based formulations of complementarity
assume that the criminal justice capacity being cultivated in developing states
should be for the purpose of vindicating ICL violations.84 Whether that is
normatively desirable, however, is questionable.
B. Universal Law for Universal Misconduct
Complementarity does not promise to be particularly pluralistic with regard
to the substance or form of justice. With regard to substance, there is a
question as to what law a domestic tribunal must apply to count for
admissibility purposes.85 Commentary tends to frame the problem in terms of
ICL’s absence—that is, the lack of ICL investigations/prosecutions in domestic
courts.86 By this view, a domestic solution should entail the express application
of ICL norms in a proceeding that conforms to due process.87 The Rome
Statute does not explicitly create this requirement.88 Nonetheless,
commentators share deep faith in ICL’s unique expressive force.
Complementarity will likely require that the ICC reconcile that faith with the
plurality of national and sub-national approaches that are possible for dealing
with the kinds of misconduct to which ICL applies.
The Rome Statute does not directly speak to the question of whether a
domestic tribunal needs to apply ICL to misconduct to render a case
concerning the conduct “inadmissible.”89 While the argument that the Rome

83

See supra Part II.A.1.
See, e.g., Heller, supra note 58, at 88–89, 97 (describing “hard mirror” and “soft mirror” theses of
complementarity).
85 See id. at 88–89, 97.
86 Kevin Jon Heller nicely summarizes (and critiques) the various positions in a recent article. See
generally id. Proponents of the “hard mirror thesis” insist that only investigations/prosecutions under ICL
satisfy complementarity. Id. at 88‒89. Proponents of the “soft mirror thesis,” on the other hand, suggest that
while prosecutions under domestic law may suffice, prosecutions under ICL would clearly be superior. Id. at
97.
87 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(2); Heller, supra note 58, at 88.
88 See id.
89 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
84
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Statute does not require a domestic proceeding under ICL is plausible,90 so too
is the contrary argument. Article 17 simply states that a case is inadmissible if
it “is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over
it.”91 Such a case is inadmissible only to the extent that the state is willing and
able “genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”92 The Rome
Statute does not expressly define unwillingness or inability in terms of a state’s
failure to apply ICL in a particular case.93 In situations where a state has
investigated and/or prosecuted an individual, the Rome Statute defines
“unwillingness” to mean that the state undertook the domestic prosecution for
the purpose of shielding the individual from ICC investigation and/or
prosecution.94 The Rome Statute, however, does not purport to enumerate an
exhaustive definition of “unwillingness” or “inability:” The drafters’ choice to
specifically identify sham trials need not have been to the exclusion of other
possible deficiencies that would make this case admissible.
One might read the reference to “case” in Article 17 to support the
conclusion that a state must bring a case under ICL in order to render it
inadmissible in the ICC.95 Article 17(1) states that “a case is inadmissible
where: [t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State.”96 A technical
legal definition of “case” is a “criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy
at law or in equity.”97 The article “the” suggests identity between whatever
case is before the ICC and that “being investigated or prosecuted by a State.”98
“Case” might also be read in a more colloquial way to refer to the underlying

90 The Pre-Trial Chamber recently interpreted the Rome Statute when it denied Libya’s challenge to the
admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah AlSenussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi,
paras. 85–88 (May 31, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf. The PTC’s discussion,
however, was brief and did not have tremendous bearing on the outcome of the admissibility challenge. For a
summary and discussion of the ruling, see M. Christopher Pitts, Being Able To Prosecute Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi: Applying Article 17(3) Of The Rome Statute To Libya, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1291 (2013). Kevin
Jon Heller has also persuasively argued that the Rome Statute does not require that a domestic prosecution be
pursuant to ICL to render a case inadmissible . See Heller, supra note 58, at 88–92.
91 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a).
92 Id.; see also id. art. 20(3) (stating that an individual who has already been tried by a domestic court
cannot be tried again before the ICC).
93 See id. art. 17(2).
94 Id. arts. 17(2)(a), 20(3)(a).
95 See e.g., Heller, supra note 58, at 204.
96 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a) (emphasis added).
97 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 243 (9th ed. 2009).
98 The Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a).
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facts that gave rise to the controversy.99 The Court, however, has tended to
read the Rome Statute narrowly in favor of finding cases admissible—for
example, the Appeals Chamber denied an admissibility challenge brought by
Kenya, the first admissibility challenge brought by a state.100
In its opinion, the Appeals Chamber stated that to be inadmissible, a
“national investigation must cover the same individual and substantially the
same conduct” as that in the case before the ICC.101 The case arose from the
violence surrounding the 2008 elections in Kenya and names Uhuru Kenyatta,
the president of Kenya, as a defendant.102 The Appeals Chamber rejected the
admissibility challenge despite Kenya’s representations that a domestic
investigation into the violence was ongoing.103 Because the investigation did
not, at the time of the challenge, encompass the defendants charged in the ICC
cases, the Appeals Chamber deemed those cases admissible.104 The Appeals
Chamber was unmoved by Kenya’s representation that it was preparing to
investigate the defendants or others at the same level.105 Several years earlier,
in Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber defined “conduct” narrowly to mean that a
domestic investigation/prosecution must encompass the same charges as those
pending before the ICC.106 Ironically, the charges pending against Lubanga in
the ICC were arguably less numerous and serious than those pending against

99

See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta, & Ali, Case No. ICC 01/09-02/11OA, Judgment on the Appeal
of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II Of 30 May 2011 Entitled “Decision on
the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article
19(2)(b) of the Statute” para. 27, (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1223134.pdf.
[hereinafter Kenya Admissibility Decision] (“In the view of Kenya . . . [the admissibility test that applies is]
the test developed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Article 15 Decision should be applied to the Admissibility
Challenge. According to that test, the national proceedings must ‘cover the same conduct in respect of persons
at the same level in the hierarchy being investigated by the ICC.”) The Appeals Chamber rejected Kenya’s
argument. Id. para. 41.
100 Charles Jalloh, Kenya vs. The ICC Prosecutor, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 269, 270 (2013), http://
www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/HILJ-Online_53_Jalloh2.pdf; see also Kenya Admissibility
Decision, supra note 99, para. 40. (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1223134.pdf.
101 Kenya Admissibility Decision, supra note 99, para. 39.
102 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenyatta is Declared the Victor in Kenya, but Opponent Plans to Appeal, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, at A8.
103 Kenya Admissibility Decision, supra note 99, paras. 51, 69.
104 Id. paras. 40, 46.
105 Id.
106 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial
Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case
Against Mr. Thomas Lubango Dyilo, paras. 37–38 (Feb. 24, 2006), [hereinafter Lubanga February Decision]
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc236260.pdf.
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him in the Democratic Republic of Congo.107 The Appeals Chamber has not
specifically addressed the question of whether domestic courts must prosecute
under ICL to satisfy the “same person, same conduct” test.108 That said, the
Court’s opinions suggest an inclination to understand complementarity
narrowly in favor of admissibility.109 This suggests that the Court may be
inclined to require domestic prosecutions under ICL (or a domestic cognate).
While some commentators have criticized the ICC for understanding
complementarity too narrowly,110 most tend to view it as preferable for
domestic courts to apply ICL as opposed to domestic criminal law in cases that
allow for the former.111 This preference is most plausibly grounded in
expressive theories of the criminal sanction.112 If for no other reason, this
conclusion seems correct because retribution and deterrence-based rationales—
the other two rationales traditionally advanced for the criminal sanction—
provide such poor justification for ICL.113 Retributivist accounts suggest that a
criminal should be punished in strict proportion to the moral gravity of his
misconduct—such moral reckoning will often be impossible given mass
atrocities’ scale.114 Deterrence provides a similarly unsatisfying account
because there is little to suggest that punishing perpetrators of past atrocities
does anything to influence would-be perpetrators of future atrocities.115
A conviction secured under ICL is tantamount to universal
condemnation—in theory it produces expressive force calibrated to the gravity
of mass atrocities.116 By “expressive force,” I refer to the social meaning that

107 See Thomas Obel Hansen, A Critical Review of the ICC’s Recent Practice Concerning Admissibility
Challenges and Complementarity, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2012); Newton, supra note 13, at 156.
108 The Appeals Chamber has yet to consider Libya’s admissibility challenge to the case against Saif AlIslam Gaddafi. See supra note 90.
109 Lubanga February Decision, supra note 106, paras. 37–39.
110 Newton, supra note 13, at 156; Jalloh, supra note 100, at 282–84
111 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
112 Heller, supra note 58, at 130–32.
113 See Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing To Prosecute: Expressive Selection At The International
Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 265, 269‒70, 313‒17 (2012); Heller, supra note 58, at 130–31.
114 See Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Court Context: Mediating The Global And Local In
The Age Of Accountability, 97 AM J. INT’L L. 712, 721 (2003) (quoting Letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl
Jaspers, Aug. 17, 1946, in HANNAH ARENDT-KARL JASPERS CORRESPONDENCE, 1926‒1969, at 51, 54 (Lotte
Kohler & Hans Saner eds., 1992)).
115 See Mark Drumbl, Collective Violence And Individual Punishment: The Criminality Of Mass Atrocity,
99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 545–46, 590‒91 (2005).
116 See deGuzman, supra note 113, at 316; Heller, supra note 58, at 130–31.
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official, punitive denunciation produces.117 Calling someone a “criminal” is to
symbolically degrade him in the name of the community that constitutes the
relevant jurisdiction. A simple expressivist account of ICL suggests that
because mass atrocities constitute a grave offense against all humankind, an
appropriate punishment must condemn in the name of all humankind.118 ICL
purports to do precisely that. Even those, like Kevin Heller, who see
convictions under domestic criminal law as a plausible substitute for ICL
convictions, concede that the former will not have the expressive force of the
latter.119
The problem with the simple expressivist account of ICL is that it
artificially cabins “social meaning” and relies on a reductionist account of
“humankind” that privileges the perspective of legally-trained professionals.120
The simple expressivist account of ICL takes “social meaning” to describe the
symbolic meaning that international lawyers (perhaps legally-trained
professionals more generally) ascribe to ICL’s application.121 Those who have
studied ICL understand that when a conviction under ICL is secured, it
symbolizes the broadest condemnation that can be leveled against an
individual within a legal order.122 Whether such a representative act produces
social meaning in precisely the same way beyond the realm of legally-trained
professionals, however, is difficult to say. Social meaning is not realized in
neat or uniform ways.123 As with any symbolic meaning, a given community
will understand symbols through the lens of its own unique social situation,
historical experience, and so forth.124 Such understandings may be quite
different from those of any other community.125 A rigorous expressivist
account of ICL prosecutions and convictions would explore such differential
meanings in all their complexity. While such an endeavor is well beyond what
117 See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 98
(1970); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 419–20 (1999).
118 Of course, a more nuanced expressivist account is possible, but this is the short version of the textbook
account that is routinely deployed in ICL literature. See, deGuzman, supra note 113, at 278–81 (summarizing
views regarding the “ephemeral global community” for which international tribunals purport to speak); Heller,
supra note 58, at 130–31.
119 Heller, supra note 58, at 131.
120 Cf. Drumbl, supra note 115, at 598 (suggesting that complementarity may “ensconce ICC process and
punishment preferences” at the expense of locally-grounded conceptions of justice).
121 See id.
122 See id. at 592–93.
123 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 39–40 (John B. Thompson ed., Gino
Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., 1991).
124 Id.
125 Id.
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is possible here, I offer a few tentative remarks on possible trajectories for such
expressivist analysis.
We should expect a circumspect expressivist analysis to pay attention not
only to the forms that ICL’s application takes, but also to the sociopolitical
contexts in which those forms evolved and are applied. ICL scholars impute
substantial moral and therapeutic power to a criminal trial and punishment.126
The imputation is notwithstanding the absence of empirical evidence
substantiating it.127 The inclination to ascribe great power to highly ritualized
performances—like a criminal trial—is broadly shared.128 All organized
societies have forms of ritual performance—whether secular, religious, or
both—that are imagined as having the capacity to produce salutary effects.129
The criminal trial represents a specific form of ritual performance—one that
traces its lineage deeply into Judeo-Christian history.130 This is to say that a
criminal trial conforming to due process standards reflects a culturally specific
process for resolving disputes. It is not a universal form of justice and it is
counterproductive to proceed as if it were. Mark Drumbl has thoughtfully
advanced an argument along these lines at length.131 He persuasively argues
that criminal trials have the potential to further “disenfranchise” those
victimized by mass violence.132 The criminal trial may not be responsive to the
psychic needs of those communities for which it is not an organic justice
ritual.133 Worse, insisting that a criminal trial is the only acceptable form of a
justice ritual may be reminiscent of colonial impositions of the not so distant
past.134
This is all to say that the unanswered question of what law counts for
complementarity purposes cannot be easily answered without also addressing
what form of adjudication counts.

126

See Drumbl, supra note 115, at 576 (citations omitted).
See id.
128 See SpearIt, Legal Punishment as Civil Ritual: Making Cultural Sense of Harsh Punishment, 82 MISS.
L.J. 1, 10–17 (2013) (discussing the Judeo-Christian origins for Western Civilization’s conception of law).
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See Drumbl, supra note 115, at 547–49.
132 See id. at 597–98.
133 See id. at 600.
134 See infra Part II.D.
127
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C. Politics, Sovereignty, and Justice
Those who imagine the ICC contributing to a new global, criminal justice
order view complementarity as a mechanism for apolitically resolving conflicts
between the ICC and states. Although some ICC insiders have suggested that
such apolitical decision-making is already the order of the day,135 such a vision
of complementarity seems more aspiration than reality. It is an important
aspiration because sovereignty remains a defining feature of the international
system. In addition, the prospect of a European-based court making political
judgments about the quality of justice available in post-colonial states is
symbolically fraught, to say the least.136 However, the Rome Statute itself
appears to require that the ICC make irreducibly political judgments in at least
two dimensions. First, it calls for judgments about the quality of a State Party’s
investigatory and adjudicatory efforts in particular cases if not its criminal
justice system as a whole.137 Second, the Rome Statute is likely to compel
judgments about the adequacy of alternative resolution mechanisms—for
example, non-western processes such as gacaca138—that may not conform to
international due process norms.139 Whether such processes should render a
case inadmissible will require judgments about the processes’ fairness and
expressive value.140 As suggested by the discussion in the preceding section,
such judgments cannot be anything but “political” given the cultural specificity
of any dispute-resolution mechanism.141
Article 17 seems to require that the Court make judgments about the
integrity and quality of justice dispensed by a state that purports to be
investigating or prosecuting the same case as that before the ICC.142 In
particular, Article 17 requires judgment as to: a) whether a state is actually
investigating or prosecuting the misconduct and if so, b) whether the state is
“willing” and “able” to proceed in a manner that is “genuine.”143 Article 17
goes on to describe the factors that the Court should consider in assessing a

135

See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 1, at 22–23. But see Drumbl, supra note 115, at 605.
See Drumbl, supra note 115, at 601.
137 Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 17(2)–(3).
138 See Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional” Justice: The Case Of Gacaca Courts In PostGenocide Rwanda, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 765, 778–89 (2007) (tracing the history of gacaca).
139 See Drumbl, supra note 115, at 600–01.
140 See Clark, supra note 138, at 804 (discussing the legitimacy of gacaca to deal with genocide).
141 See supra Part II.B.
142 See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 1, at 23.
143 Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 17(1)(a)–(b).
136
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state’s “unwillingness.”144 The factors include whether the state’s investigation
or prosecution was undertaken “for the purpose of shielding” the defendant.145
In addition, the Court considers whether the investigation or prosecution is
“being conducted independently or impartially.”146 The Court conducts both
inquiries with sensitivity to “principles of due process recognized by
international law.”147
Assessment of state actors’ motivations, as Article 17(2)(a) requires, seems
to demand a politically inflected analysis. Assuming that the relevant actors
deny having had impermissible motives in undertaking particular official
actions, the Court will have to assess the truth of such claims. Doing so will
require making educated inferences based on a state actor’s relationship to the
accused, the relevant conduct, and the broader political landscape. Such factual
judgments are tricky in any context, but that is all the more true where an
international tribunal is passing judgment on a state actor’s motivations. There
is an obviously political dimension to the ICC given that it is a Hague-based
tribunal largely focused on misconduct occurring in post-colonial states. The
resonance with colonial hierarchies is potentially even more pitched when
evaluating the “independence” or “impartiality” of a state’s investigative
efforts.148 While Article 17 suggests that the inquiry should pertain to only the
case in question,149 it might be difficult to do so without some consideration of
the broader institutional context. A state institution’s partiality when
investigating or adjudicating a particular case may be a function of broader
problems with those institutions. This is most likely to be true where
underdevelopment has created significant rule of law gaps—an entirely
common feature in large swathes of the post-colonial world.150
Dodging such tricky political questions is not obviously any less “political”
than squarely addressing them. Michael Newton has expressed concern about
the ICC impinging on states’ sovereign prerogatives.151 He notes that the
drafters designed the Rome Statute’s complementarity scheme to secure the
support of states that would otherwise have been hesitant to compromise their
144

Id. art. 17(2).
Id. art. 17(2)(a).
146 Id. art. 17(2)(c).
147 Id. art. 17(2).
148 Cf. Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the
International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 400–04 (2005).
149 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1).
150 See supra Part II.A.1.
151 Newton, supra note 13, at 122.
145
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sovereignty.152 Accordingly, he argues, the Court’s complementarity analysis
should be deferential to states parties’ efforts to remedy ICL violations.153
While Newton’s reading of the Rome Statute’s drafting history may be correct,
deferring to sovereign prerogatives is no less “political” than not doing so. One
benefit, perhaps the chief one, of the Court adopting Newton’s suggestion
would be that, by so doing, the ICC would be transparently embracing a
method for navigating the political dilemmas its founding document compels it
to confront. However, the Court’s admissibility decisions in the Kenya cases
suggest that the Court is disinclined to take such a route.
Among Kenya’s challenges to admissibility was a procedural argument that
the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) erroneously refused to permit Kenya additional
time to demonstrate that its investigation had progressed to include the
defendants or others acting at a comparable level.154 In upholding the PTC’s
procedural rulings, the Appeals Chamber emphasized the discretion the PTC
enjoys in making such determinations.155 This procedural determination might
very well have saved the Appeals Chamber from having to wrestle with the
difficult political questions suggested above156—had Kenya returned to the
Court with evidence that its investigation, in some capacity, pertained to the
defendants, it would have had to fully analyze the investigation under Article
17.157
Devising an apolitical complementarity framework for alternative
resolution mechanisms is also likely impossible. Alternative resolution
mechanisms describe dispute resolution practices that do not conform to the
Western-style criminal trial—an individualized, truth-seeking process that is
administered by a state and focused on establishing the appropriateness of
imposing punishment upon a specific individual.158 Alternative resolution
mechanisms might include local approaches to justice, such as the indigenous

152

See id.
Id. at 136–37.
154 See Appeals Chamber decision, supra note 100, para. 104.
155 Id. para. 108.
156 In a vigorous dissent, Judge Anita Usacka took the majority to task for not wrestling with the difficult,
but unanswered questions that complementarity implicates. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta, & Ali, Case No.
ICC-01/09-02/11OA, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, paras. 25–26 (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1234881.pdf.
157 See id. para. 27; see also Hansen, supra note 107, at 17 (criticizing the Court for not engaging
admissibility challenge under Art. 17(2)).
158 See Clark, supra, note 138, at 822–23.
153
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Rwandan practice of gacaca.159 Such local dispute resolution mechanisms are
as varied as are the local communities that rely upon them around the world.160
As Gregory Gordon recently summarized, these mechanisms have “varying
degrees of connection” to official State institutions and often permit broad
community participation with the aim of achieving more “holistic” effects than
is true for Western-style criminal trials.161 Alternative resolution mechanisms
also might include decidedly non local, official tribunals like truth and
reconciliation commissions of the sort used in post-apartheid South Africa.162
With these commissions there has been considerable variation regarding
purpose and procedure.163 The Rome Statute does not offer precise guidance
on how to gauge the admissibility of cases regarding misconduct that have
been (or will be) subject to an alternative resolution mechanism, but it does
suggest a general approach.
Article 17’s language appears to require that the Court evaluate whether a
particular alternative resolution mechanism is sufficiently connected to a
state’s official justice system and affords process sufficiently analogous to that
afforded in a Western-style criminal trial. Article 17 states that a case is
inadmissible where it “is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has
jurisdiction over it.”164 In addition, Article 17 directs the Court to carry out the
admissibility analysis with “regard to the principles of due process recognized
by international law.”165 This language suggests that the Rome Statute’s
drafters not only conceived of complementarity as a relation between the ICC
and state institutions, but also took the Western-style trial as the evaluative
reference point.
This reading of Article 17 is also consistent with commentary regarding
alternative resolution mechanisms. Gregory Gordon has proposed a multifactor test for evaluating admissibility challenges that emphasizes the alternate
resolution mechanism’s “judicialization” and incorporation by the relevant

159 See e.g., Clark supra, note 138, at 778 (stating that traditional gacaca was different than the statesupported practice created to adjudicate genocide cases).
160 See Gregory Gordon, Complementarity and Alternative Forms of Justice, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note 1, 745, 752‒65 (describing representative examples of
such dispute resolution mechanisms).
161 See id. at 752–53.
162 See id. at 765–68.
163 See id. at 766.
164 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17 (1)(a)–(b).
165 See id. art. 17(2).
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state.166 In contrast, Mark Drumbl has criticized the extent to which the Rome
Statute and international law more generally have fetishisized Western-style
criminal trials.167 This is not merely a question of the Rome Statute’s text or
drafting history. Drumbl’s work suggests that there is a deeper,
epistemological explanation for the criminal trial’s centrality in the imaginings
of post-atrocity justice.168 International law scholars and professionals—the
primary agents of ICL discourse—are typically acculturated in educational,
practice, and social environments where the criminal trial is the sine qua non
of justice following violence.169 From their vantage, punishing wrongdoers and
achieving broad healing for the communities affected by violence are
coterminous enterprises.170 This equation helps create what Payan Akhavan
has called a “false sense of closure within a self-absorbed utopia.”171 This
anthropologically specific view predominates amongst the legal professionals
who are responsible for steering ICL generally and the ICC in particular.172
Given the Rome Statute’s express language and the culture of international
legal professionals, there is little reason to think that ICC will embrace a
particularly permissive approach to alternative resolution mechanisms. This, in
conjunction with the discussion in Subpart B, tends to suggest that a vigorous
regime of complementarity is not likely to promote pluralism with regard to
the form or content of post-atrocity justice. This is not troubling if one views
ICL and, correspondingly, the criminal trial as providing a close proxy for
universal justice. That view, however, is deeply problematic.
D. Speaking To The Subaltern
Complementarity discourse is tightly organized around the relationship
between the ICC and sovereign states.173 While this may seem like a statement
of the obvious, it invites the deeper questions of whom complementarity is
supposed to benefit and, by extension, who ICL’s intended audience should be.

166

Gordon, supra note 160, at 784–94.
See Drumbl, supra note 115, at 596–97.
168 See id. at 567
169 Id. at 46.
170 Id.
171 See Akhavan, supra note 114, at 721.
172 See id.
173 See e.g., Jalloh, supra note 100, at 274–75 (noting that complementarity is the fundamental principle
of relationship between ICC and sovereign states).
167
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Positive complementarity’s enthusiasts aspire for an ICC that works
alongside domestic courts to bring ICL violators to justice under a broadly
shared set of substantive and procedural legal principles.174 For some,
sovereignty is not so much a lamentable obstacle as it is a neutral fact that
defines the terms on which a global division of conflict-resolution labor will be
realized.175 For those liberal internationalists who view sovereignty as an
impediment to global justice, positive complementarity is just a moment in a
long historic process that remains incomplete.176 By this view,
complementarity reflects a familiar compromise—it reaffirms sovereignty’s
continued vitality as the unhappy cost of obtaining state consensus for the
development of international law and institutions.177
What is important for present purposes though, is that both groups share a
universalist ideal as to what redress for mass atrocities should look like:
criminal prosecutions according to uniform global norms of substance and
procedure.178 But, in what measure does such redress promote healing and
closure for the “masses” that are the object of mass atrocities?
Nearly twenty-five years ago, Gayatri Spivak asked whether the subaltern
can speak.179 The basic premise of ICL’s universalist aspiration should impel
us to ask a homologous question: Can the subaltern be spoken to? While it is
beyond this essay’s scope to fully develop the inquiry as a theoretical matter, I
raise the question to suggest that the complementarity debate reveals a more
significant limitations of the ICC and ICL discourse generally.
“Subaltern” does not describe a fixed demographic group (e.g., a racial
minority) per se, but rather a relation of dominance.180 It is the relation of
dominance that, among other things, separates those who are able to represent
their interests to official power from those who are not.181 This capacity is a
function of both material privilege within a social structure and the attendant
174

See supra Part I.
See Akhavan, supra note 114, at 714.
176 See Newton, supra note 13, at 119 (quoting Benjamin Ferencz, Address by Benjamin B. Ferencz to the
Rome Conference on Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court (June 16, 1998), available at http://
www.benferencz.org/index.php?id=4&article=85).
177 See Newton, supra note 13, at 163–64.
178 See Akhavan, supra note 114, at 721.
179 See generally Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND
POST-COLONIAL THEORY: A READER 66 (Patrick Williams & Laura Chrisman eds., 1994) (expressing
pessimism about the possibility that the subalterns will be able to express their voice in post-colonial society).
180 See id. at 79–80.
181 See id.
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access to the dominant political vocabulary.182 In the context of colonial India,
for example, one can use the notion of subalternity to distinguish between the
“native elites,” who became nationalist leaders, from “subsistence farmers,
unorganized peasant labor, [and] the tribals.”183 It is the native elite—Gandhi
and Nehru—who are commemorated for having created an independent postcolonial State.184 While conventional historical accounts cast them as heroic
representatives of all colonized Indians, the subaltern history depicts a
significantly messier and less flattering account of the native elite.185
Complicating any scholarly exploration of this dynamic is the simple fact that
subaltern voices were not recorded.186 The native elite purported to speak on
behalf of subaltern groups—which is to say, subaltern groups’ interests were
accounted for in a voice not their own.187 This just restates the point that the
possibility for authentic, subaltern self-representation was not possible in a
nationalist discourse that was carried out between native elites and the colonial
power. The subaltern were talked about rather than heard.188 Accordingly,
contemporary historiographic efforts to account for those voices can only be
partial at best. But what they do reveal is that subaltern understandings of
(elite) nationalist figures and anti-colonial struggle were often quite farremoved from how elite nationalist figures imagined themselves and their
struggle.189 At least two points about subalternity are relevant to a discussion
of ICL.
First, it is frequently members of subaltern groups who bear the brunt of
mass atrocities.190 It is, however, also frequently members of subaltern groups
who perpetrate mass atrocities.191 In Darfur, for instance, both the victims and
perpetrators of mass violence have been members of heterogeneous groups that

182

See id. at 83.
See id. at 84.
184 See Ranajit Guha, On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India, in SELECTED SUBALTERN
STUDIES 37, 38 (Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak eds., 1988).
185 Jonathan Todres, Out of Africa: Reading Martin Chanock’s Scholarship in the Global North, 28 L. IN
CONTEXT 47, 50 (2010) (noting Martin Chanock’s identification of this point).
186 Spivak, supra note 179, at 82.
187 See id. at 80.
188 See id. at 103–04.
189 See Shahid Amin, Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 1921–2’, in SELECTED
SUBALTERN STUDIES 288, 289‒94 (Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak eds., 1988).
190 See U.N. Security Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the
Secretary-General, 4, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005).
191 Id.
183

SEKHON GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

COMPLEMENTARITY AND POST-COLONIALITY

4/14/2014 9:57 AM

823

share divergent histories of extreme economic and political marginality.192 The
victims do not share a single linguistic, ethnic, or tribal identity.193 They do,
however, share the economic and social status of being small-scale farmers.194
While they have been pejoratively called “African” by their attackers, that
designation is not one that the victims themselves would have necessarily used
to self-identify before the attacks.195 That is to say, the victims did not have
ready access to the language of minority rights. Even if they had, there was no
representative body to speak that language on their behalf.
It is tempting to think of the Janjaweed—the state-supported militias
responsible for much violence in Darfur—as a homogeneous group. Such an
assumption, however, is unwarranted.196 The Janjaweed consists of
heterogeneous groups including both Arabs and non-Arabs.197 The groups tend
to be nomadic herders, many of whom are economically and politically
marginal.198 Compounding that marginality has been the breakdown of
customary norms that permitted these groups access to water and grazing
land.199 Militia activity is the only way for such groups to secure any resources
from the Sudanese state.200 A recent report concludes that responding to mass
violence in Darfur will require constructively engaging the groups that
constitute the Janjaweed and responding to the underlying structural
circumstances that impel individuals to join militias.201 This prescription does
not begin to speak to the complex questions of how to handle those who have
perpetrated mass violence.
To the extent that a significant part of ICL’s broad purpose is to create the
terms upon which community healing and closure may occur in the wake of

192 See Julie Flint, Beyond “Janjaweed,” Understanding the Militias of Darfur 11‒15 (Small Arms
Survey HSBA Working Paper No. 17, 2009), available at http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBASWP-17-Beyond-Janjaweed.pdf.
193 See Kristina Hon, Bringing Cultural Genocide in by the Backdoor: Victim Participation at the ICC, 43
SETON HALL L. REV. 359, 400 (2013).
(Rule. 16.4)
194 U.N. Security Council, supra note 190, para. 51.
195 See id. para. 511.
196 The state-supported militia consisted of members from different tribes and groups that saw
opportunities to access land and political power. See Flint, supra note 192, at 14–15.
197 See U.N. Security Council, supra note 190, paras. 101–04.
198 See Flint, supra note 192, at 13.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 49.
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mass atrocity, it must try to speak to subaltern groups.202 It is tempting to view
complementarity as at least a partial answer to that question—national courts
are better equipped for the task because of their proximity to subaltern groups.
However, we should be skeptical of this suggestion given the structure of
power in many post-colonial states.
This suggests a second point about subalternity: official state structures,
courts included, in many post-colonial states are not well-equipped to
meaningfully listen or speak to subaltern groups. The autocratic Sudanese state
presents an extreme example—it is deeply implicated in the mass violence that
has occurred in Darfur.203 But even in more functional post-colonial states,204
the structure of political and judicial power was inherited from colonial
predecessors. In many post-colonial States, the native nationalist elite simply
took the reins of power from departing colonial authorities.205 They did so
without fundamentally reworking the relations of power that characterized the
colonial States—this has meant that decolonization, for many subaltern groups,
has simply meant that one group of elites supplanted another. In these postcolonial societies, subalternity remains a persistent feature. Landless peasants
in rural India, nomadic pastoralists in Sudan, and street kids in the Global
South206 are examples of the vast swathes of humanity that inhabit the Third
World’s marginal spaces—the margin’s margins. These are groups that live in
the deep shadows of both the formal economy and civil society.
Justice dispensed by a national court may be no better able to speak to
subaltern groups within its borders than an international tribunal. The fact that
a jurisdiction has incorporated ICL into its domestic code and developed some
bureaucratic capacity to process ICL cases will not change this fact.
Complementarity is largely preoccupied with how to best configure the
division of labor between the ICC and domestic courts so as maximize the
number of ICL prosecutions conforming to due process.207 This all makes good
sense if one accepts that more prosecutions means less impunity, which in turn
202 Trying may be all that is ever really possible, given that subalternity is a structural condition. The
impossibility of unimpeded communication does not relieve one of the ethical obligation to try. Cf. Spivak,
supra note 179, at 80, 104 (describing the intellectual’s obligation to try and represent subaltern voices).
203 See generally Flint, supra note 192.
204 They are the most plausible national collaborators. See supra Part I.A.1.
205 Barbara Harrell-Bond, Legitimacy and the Politics of Status—an Abortive Legislative Change in Sierra
Leone, 12 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 21, 53 (1975).
206 Jonathan Todres, Rights Relationships and the Experience of Children Orphaned by AIDS, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 417, 429, 461 (2007).
207 See Burke-White, supra note 1, at 54–55.
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means more justice. While this logic is impeccable within the world of legal
professionals,208 this does not mean that it will register as such in subaltern
spaces.
III. COMPLEMENTARITY AND GOVERNMENTALITY
The normative adjectives used to describe complementarity suggest too
muscular (e.g., “proactive”) or too anemic (e.g., “passive”) a view of the ICC’s
role in global justice.209 The discussion in Part II suggested that the more
ambitious notions of positive complementarity draw the ICC into a universe of
political, economic, and social questions that it is ill-equipped to handle. Even
if the ICC surmounts those obstacles, it is unclear whether a regime of positive
complementarity, under ideal circumstances, will benefit those most impacted
by mass atrocities. An entirely negative account of complementarity, however,
minimizes the ICC’s institutional significance. The institution’s creation was a
milestone event and the Rome Statute does not evince an intention to create an
institution that blithely defers to national institutions.210 What then might a
constructive conceptualization of complementarity look like?
At the risk of adding to the ever-expanding list of complementarity
adjectives, “governmentality” may provide a useful framework for carrying out
future analysis of complementarity. The notion of governmentality,211
developed in sociology and anthropology might elucidate complementarity’s
significance in two ways: 1) as a bureaucratic vocabulary whose development
tracks changes in how actors within the ICC view the institution and its
relationships to national criminal justice institutions; and, 2) as creating
strategic opportunities for subordinated groups to leverage the ICC’s power to
effect national and sub-national change.
Governmentality describes, among other things,212 institutions that rely
upon instrumentalist reasoning and “secure[] legitimacy not by the
participation of citizens . . . but by claiming to provide for the well-being” of

208

See Akhavan, supra note 114, at 721.
See Burke-White, supra note 1, at 54, 56.
210 See id. at 56–57.
211 Michel Foucault coined the term. See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT:
STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87 (Graham Burchell et al. eds. 1991).
212 Foucault goes into considerable detail about the effects that particular “techniques of power” have
upon shaping both the conscious and unconscious conduct of individuals who are parts of particular groups.
See id. at 95–100.
209
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populations.213 This is in contrast to liberal ideals of “deliberative openness” in
which citizens are thought to shape government action by exerting political
agency (e.g., by voting).214 Instead, specialized bureaucracies populated by
experts manage the problems that beset or are created by particular
demographic groups—such as violent criminals, mass atrocity survivors, “at
risk” children, and cigarette smokers.215 Bureaucracies rely on technocratic
frameworks built with specialized vocabularies to accomplish social effects, to
manage relationships with other bureaucracies that have overlapping authority,
and other ends.216 In the course of performing these functions, institutionspecific forms of common sense evolve and determine how particular
problems, solutions, and demographic groups are conceived.217
Through a governmentality lens, one might analyze complementarity as a
bureaucratic mechanism for managing institutional relations between the ICC
and national criminal justice bureaucracies. Complementarity’s purpose should
not be understood as either a recipe for a new order of global justice nor as a
hindrance to sovereignty. Both of these accounts cast complementarity in bold,
normative strokes—as answering axiomatic questions in international criminal
justice. Through a governmentality lens, complementarity is best conceived as
a structured dialogue amongst technocratic elites at the international and
national levels. It creates a specialized vocabulary for negotiating the host of
bureaucratic problems that attend investigation, prosecution, and adjudication
in contexts where the authority to do so overlaps with a state’s. Those
problems may often be completely unrelated to provisions in the Rome
Statute—e.g., questions of legitimacy and developing institutional competence.
A governmentality-based approach that focuses upon bureaucratic culture
will have the benefit of descriptive accuracy. For example, such an approach to
complementarity might help us understand the extent to which legitimacy
concerns informed the OTP’s arguments and the PTC’s admissibility decision
in the Lubanga case. Lubanga was self-referred by the Democratic Republic of
Congo (“DRC”).218 At the time of the self-referral, a criminal case was
pending against Lubanga in the DRC.219 In fact, the DRC had leveled charges
213

See CHATTERJEE, supra note 36, at 34.
See id.
215 See id. at 35–37.
216 See Foucault, supra note 211, at 100‒03.
217 See id.
218 See Lubanga February Decision, supra note 106, para. 22 (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc236260.pdf.
219 See id. para. 23.
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against Lubanga that were more serious than those leveled against him in the
ICC proceedings.220 Nonetheless, the PTC denied Lubanga’s admissibility
challenge and announced the “same person, same conduct” test in so doing.221
While the DRC prosecution concerned the same person and encompassed more
serious charges than those pending in the ICC, the charges were not the
same.222 The Rome Statute did not dictate a clear admissibility result in
Lubanga. It seems possible that there was a generalized sense within the ICC
that it was important to take up (and hold onto) a case that it could plausibly
investigate and resolve—to demonstrate that it is an institution worthy of the
title “international” to consolidate its future funding stream to begin
developing the institutional ability to process cases, and so on.223
Studying complementarity through the lens of governmentality is likely to
have the additional benefit of helping identify how, if at all, the ICC may play
a role in the struggles of subordinated groups. To the extent that
governmentality helps to identify the configuration of political and social
power that particular institutions create, it also may help to identify strategies
for securing social and political benefits. To the extent that a subordinated
group is waging a national or sub-national struggle against state institutions,
complementarity is a mechanism by which the ICC might help advance such a
struggle. The Rome Statute permits the OTP to consider petitions from nonstate actors224—and the network of relationships that exist between the ICC
and national bureaucracies may influence how attractive it is to create
organizing strategies that involve the ICC.225
While complementarity is (and promises to continue being) a conceptually
rich area of study, it would be constructive to approach it with more normative
modesty. It is a good vehicle for understanding the evolving bureaucratic
culture within the ICC. It also might be a useful way of understanding the
relationships that evolve between the ICC and government elites within States,
and suggest the terms on which subordinated groups might rely upon the ICC
220 See Newton, supra note 13, at 156 (noting that the DRC charged Lubanga with genocide, whereas the
charges against Lubanga in the ICC pertained to conscripting child soldiers).
221 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr 17-03-2006, Decision to
Issue Arrest Warrant, para. 37, 40 (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc236260.pdf.
222 Id. para. 39.
223 See Jalloh, supra note 100, at 284; deGuzman, supra note 113, at 269.
224 See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15(2).
225 Cf. Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, Complimentarity in Action: The Role of Civil Society and the
ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 205, 225–26 (2011)
(summarizing the view of the ICC in Kenya).
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to effect national or sub-national change. Analysis that draws on notions of
governmentality might help temper undue exuberance about the ICC’s likely
effect on global justice. But it would do so without dismissing the ICC’s
significance as a new global institution.
CONCLUSION
While complementarity promises to remain a conceptually rich area of
study, it would be constructive to approach it with more normative modesty.
The more ambitious notions of positive complementarity ignore the patterns of
underdevelopment and politico-social fragmentation that characterize the postcolonial landscape. Complementarity is nonetheless an important framework
for understanding the ICC’s evolving bureaucratic culture and its relationships
with domestic criminal justice actors. These relationships may create strategic
opportunities for subordinated groups to effect national or sub-national change.
Analysis that draws on notions of governmentality will help temper undue
exuberance about the likelihood of a new, coordinated global order for
criminal justice. But it would do so without dismissing the ICC’s promise as an
agent for good.

